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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
A. Right of the Homemaker Spouse to Equitable
Distribution of Real Property
In Parrott v. Parrott,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized a homemaker's right upon divorce to share equitably
in all property acquired by her wage-earning spouse during the
marriage. This decision aligns South Carolina with a majority of
the states in upholding equitable distribution.' Parrott mitigates
the harsh consequences of the common-law title theory of prop-
erty division under which real property is, upon divorce, distrib-
uted to the title holder.3 The court indicates, however, that equi-
table distribution may be invoked only if a spouse can show
evidence of forgone career opportunities and material contribu-
tions to the family as homemaker throughout a long marriage.4
The dispute in Parrott arose when the parties were divorced
after a twenty-two year marriage.5 The wife had been employed
outside the home for only one year; for the rest of the marriage
she remained in the home as a housewife and mother. Other
than an inheritance, her monetary contributions to the marital
property were minimal. The family court denied the wife's claim
for a share of the parties' real and personal property,6 including
the marital residence to which the husband held title. In her ap-
peal to the supreme court, the wife claimed that her contribu-
tions to the marriage as housewife and mother entitled her to an
1. - S.C. -, 292 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
2. Freed and Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 7 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 4049, 4056-57 (1981).
3. In a typical case, the husband holds title to most of the couple's assets; the wife is
financially dependent upon the husband and lacks the skills necessary for entering the
job market. Under the title theory, the wife does not acquire any rights in the property
upon divorce. She must rely on alimony as her sole means of support. See Taylor v.
Taylor, 267 S.C. 530, 229 S.E.2d 852 (1976).
4. - S.C. at , 292 S.E.2d at 184.
5. Divorce was granted upon the statutory grounds of one year's separation. Id. at
-, 292 S.E.2d at 182. See, S.C. CODE ANN4. § 20-3-10 (Supp. 1982).
6. - S.C. at - 292 S.E.2d at 182.
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equitable interest in the residence and personal property of the
husband.
The supreme court initially reasoned that the wife's one
year employment outside the home and her small inheritance
were material contributions sufficient to support a claim of spe-
cial equity in the marital home.8 Distribution based solely on
special equity, however, fell far short of compensating the appel-
lant for the twenty-one years during which she contributed to
the marriage as housewife and mother.9 After weighing these
contributions together with the appellant's forgone career oppor-
tunities, the court held that she was entitled to an equitable in-
terest in all real and personal property acquired during the mar-
riage. The case was remanded for a determination of appellant's
share in the marital property.10
Although most jurisdictions have enacted statutes that pro-
vide for some form of equitable distribution, 1 South Carolina
has persistently relied on the less definitive standards of its
common law12 to determine distribution of marital property.
Parrott is evidence of continuing judicial recognition of the
often unjust consequences flowing from reliance upon the title
theory of real property distribution.'3
7. The court has long recognized the application of equitable principles to the distri-
bution of personal property. See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 268 S.C. 104, 108-09, 232 S.E.2d
326, 327 (1977).
8. - S.C. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 184. Prior to Parrott, the court had announced two
exceptions to the title theory: (1) resulting trust and (2) special equity. When a spouse
supplies funds or assumes an obligation prior to or at the acquisition of property, a re-
sulting trust favoring that party can arise. Id. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 183. Because the
evidentiary requirements are restrictive, such trusts are rarely found. Moore v. McKel-
vey, 266 S.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 780 (1976); Green v. Green, 237 S.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 583
(1960). When a spouse has made "material contributions" of industry and labor to the
acquisition of property during marriage, a special equity can be found favoring that
party. Baker v. Baker, 276 S.C. 427, 279 S.E.2d 601 (1981).
9. - S.C. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 183.
10. Id. at -, 292 S.E.2d at 184.
11. At least 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutory systems
of equitable distribution of property upon divorce. Note, New York's Equitable Distri-
bution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 67 n.1 (1980).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(2)(Supp. 1981) gives family courts the authority to
settle all legal and equitable rights of divorcing parties in real and personal property if
requested by either party in the pleadings. Neither party in Parrott requested such a
settlement. Cf. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974)(parties petitioned the
court to divide property without regard to title).
13. In Jeffords v. Hall, 276 S.C. 271, 277 S.E.2d 703 (1981), the court tacitly ap-
proved the adoption of equitable distribution as another means of dividing property
2
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The question of how the marital home might be equitably
distributed remains unresolved. While a monetary distribution is
the remedy most often utilized and inures to the benefit of both
parties,14 the court does not suggest whether the distribution
would be payable in a lump sum or in installments. Further-
more, while the court clearly limits equitable distribution to
homemakers who over a "long marriage" helped provide a "suit-
able family environment," '15 it does not define either of these
terms.
Despite these shortcomings, Parrott is a progressive step for
the rights of career homemakers who are faced with legislative
inadequacies and an antiquated common law. The court has at-
tempted to offer some guidelines, but clear statutory standards
governing the equitable distribution of property are needed to
add certainty to this rapidly expanding area of the law.
Hayne A. Botts
B. Equitable Distribution of Interspousal Gifts
In Burgess v. Burgess,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a gift from a husband to his wife was subject to equita-
ble distribution. In so holding, the court for the first time cate-
gorized interspousal gifts as marital property and thus placed
these gifts within the divorce jurisdiction of the family courts.
Burgess involved a divorce action brought on the grounds of
a one year separation. Following a hearing before a family court
judge, the wife was awarded a $10,000 equitable settlement and
denied alimony.1 7 On appeal, the supreme court reversed and re-
among divorcing spouses. Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of S.C. Law, 34 S.C.L.
REv. 125, 134 (1982). The court in Bugg v. Bugg, 277 S.C. 270, 286 S.E.2d 135 (1982)
again used this terminology in allowing the appellant wife a larger equitable interest in
the parties' real property upon divorce. But the cases can be distinguished in that the
appellant in Bugg worked both in and out of the home for thirty-seven years while the
appellant in Parrott remained in the home as a housewife and mother for nearly the
length of her twenty-two year marriage. - S.C. at , 292 S.E.2d at 183. See also Chas-
tain, Henry and Woodside, Determination of Property Rights Upon Divorce in S.C.: An
Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. PRay. 227, 233 (1981).
14. Note, supra note 11, at 98.
15. - S.C. at , 292 S.E.2d at 184.
16. 277 S.C. 283, 286 S.E.2d 142 (1982).
17. Id. at 286, 286 S.E.2d at 143. Total property awards by the family court were as
follows:
1983]
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manded.18 In setting aside the lower court's award, the, court in
Burgess held inter alia that interspousal gifts were subject to
equitable distribution. This holding rejects the common law rule
that gifts are not generally included in equitable divorce settle-
ments since property is distributed on the basis of title.,,
The court based its decision on section 14-21-1020 of the
South Carolina Code of Laws (Supp. 1980). This section grants
family courts jurisdiction in divorce actions to settle "all equita-
ble rights of the parties as to all 'real and personal property of
the marriage.' "20 The court reasoned that since interspousal
gifts are presumably purchased with marital funds, they qualify
as property of the marriage and not property of the individual
bearing title.2 1
The Burgess court also relied on several Illinois cases in
reaching its decision.22 Illinois, however, is one of only eight
states that has adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act2
Mr. Burgess: Marital residence valued at between $47,000 and $60,000, 1977
automobile, Dodge van, some IBM stock, one-half of the household furnish-
ings, two front-end loaders with trailers.
Mrs. Burgess: $10,000 cash, 1971 automobile.
18. In matters not relevant to the subject of this survey, the court found that the
lower court's division of property was "ridiculously disparate" and its denial of alimony
unsupported by available evidence. Id. at 286, 286 S.E.2d at 144.
19. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 244 S.C. 113, 135 S.E.2d 725 (1964); Caulk v. Caulk,
211 S.C. 57, 43 S.E.2d 600 (1947). The court has in a later case evaluated its holding in
Burgess and noted that prior to Burgess interspousal gifts were treated by courts in
property settlements as property of the title-bearing spouse: "[In Burgess] we restored
interspousal gifts to the category of marital property accesssible for distribution upon
divorce." Parrott v. Parrott, - S.C. , 292 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1982). For a discussion of
Parrott, see page 89 of this issue.
20. 277 S.C. at 287, 286 S.E.2d at 145 (emphasis by the court)(quoting S.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980), which has been repealed and incorporated into S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-70-420 (Supp. 1981)).
21. 277 S.C. at 287, 286 S.E.2d at 145.
22. Bissett v. Bissett, 375 IMI. 551, 31 N.E.2d 955 (1941); In re the Marriage of Ste-
vens, 93 IMI. App. 3d 122, 416 N.E.2d 1235 (1981); Coates v. Coates, 64 IlM. App. 3d 914,
381 N.E.2d 1200 (1978).
23. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORC E ACT § 503, 9A U.L.A. 91 (1977). In pertinent part
the Illinois act reads:
(a) For purposes of this Act, "marital property" means all property ac-
quired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following,
which is known as "non-marital property":
(1) property acquired by gift bequest, devise or descent,***
(b) All property acquired by either spouse after marriage and before a
judgment of dissolution of marriage ... is presumed to be marital property,
regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form
4
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and follows a progressive rule which permits judicial discretion
in determining the status of interspousal gifts in divorce settle-
ments. Family court judges in Illinois have the option of revest-
ing title in the donor or including the gift in the overall equita-
ble settlement.2 4 Further, the presumption that such gifts are
property of the marriage may be overcome by a showing of clear,
convincing and unmistakable evidence.2 5
Although the Illinois resolution is a fair one and thus rec-
ommends itself, the Burgess opinion provides no guidance on
how far the South Carolina Supreme Court will follow the Illi-
nois courts on the marital property issue. Burgess v. Burgess
speaks only to the issue of interspousal gifts, presumably pur-
chased with marital funds, and holds those gifts subject to equi-
table distribution upon dissolution of the marriage.
Robert T. Strickland
C. Equitable Distribution of Military and Civil Service
Retirement Pay
In Bugg v. Bugg26 and Carter v. Carter,27 the South Carolina
Supreme Court refused to allow equitable distribution of mili-
tary and civil service retirement pay in divorce proceedings. In
both decisions, however, the court recognized that retirement
pay may be taken into consideration in determining alimony.
In Bugg, the parties were divorced after a thirty-five year
marriage. The wife appealed the family court order, which inter
alia, awarded her a ten thousand dollar interest in the marital
home. On appeal, the wife claimed an equitable interest in her
husband's military retirement pay, as well as a larger interest in
the home. At oral argument, however, counsel for the wife with-
drew the claim to the retirement pay on the grounds that Mc-
of co-ownership.... The presumption of marital property is overcome by a
showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of
this Section.
ILu. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(1), (b) (1979).
24. Bissett v. Bissett, 357 IMI. at 555-56, 31 N.E.2d at 958. See also 24 Am. JuR. 2D
Divorce and Separation § 930 (1966).
25. In re the Marriage of Stevens, 93 IML App. 3d at 125, 416 N.E.2d at 1238.
26. 277 S.C. 270, 286 S.E.2d 135 (1982).
27. 277 S.C. 277, 286 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
1983]
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Carty v. McCarty2 ' controlled.29 In McCarty, the United States
Supreme Court held that military retirement payments are not
subject to the rule imposed by community property states enti-
tling divorcing spouses to a one-half interest in all property ac-
quired during the marriage.3 Although South Carolina is not a
community property state, the South Carolina Supreme Court
agreed that McCarty controlled the disposition of military re-
tirement pay in South Carolina as well.3 1
The parties' divorce in Carter ended a twenty-eight year
marriage. The husband appealed the family court order award-
ing the wife a portion of his federal civil service retirement pay.
Citing McCarty, the supreme court reversed the lower court or-
der and held that the pension could not be treated as marital
property in a divorce or separation proceeding.3 2
Relying on McCarty, the court in Carter stated that al-
lowing equitable distribution of retirement payments would
threaten "substantial federal interests" 83 and frustrate Congres-
sional objectives.' 4 Although McCarty focused on military pen-
sions, the Carter court, without explaining its reasoning, held
that the policies enunciated in McCarty warranted extension of
the rule to civil service pensions. In a footnote, the court further
suggested that contributions to any private pension fund are
"generally not subject to" equitable distribution."5 As in Bugg,
the court in Carter did note that retirement pay may be consid-
ered in determining alimony. 6
The Carter court's refusal to allow equitable distribution of
a spouse's civil service retirement pay is a significant broadening
of the rule in McCarty, and places South Carolina in the minor-
ity of the jurisdictions that have considered the question. 7 In
28. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
29. 277 S.C. at 272, 286 S.E.2d at 136.
30. 453 U.S. at 223.
31. 277 S.C. at 272, 286 S.E.2d at 136. See also, 2 EQurrABLF DISTRmaUTON RE-
PORTER 99 (1982)(reasoning of McCarty applies to noncommunity property jurisdictions).
32. 277 S.C. at 279, 286 S.E.2d at 140.
33. Id., 286 S.E.2d at 140.
34. Id., 286 S.E.2d at 140.
35. Id. at 279 n.1, 286 S.E.2d at 140 n.1.
36. Id. at 279, 286 S.E.2d at 140.
37. The majority of jurisdictions recognize vested pension plans (other than mili-
tary) as marital property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Greg-
ory J.M. v. Carolyn A.M., 442 A.2d 1373, 1375 (DeL Super. Ct. 1982); In re Marriage of
[Vol. 35
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extending McCarty the court also ignored section 8345(i)(1) of
the Civil Service Retirement Act."8 Section 8345(i)(1) of the Act
provides for direct payments to any person who has been
awarded a share of a civil service pension in separation or di-
vorce proceedings. Given congressional acceptance of equitable
distribution of civil service pensions, it is unclear what "substan-
tial federal interests" and "congressional objectives" support the
court's holding in Carter.-9
Under Bugg and Carter, military and civil service retire-
ment pay can not be treated as marital property subject to equi-
table distribution. Dicta in Carter suggest that the court may
prohibit equitable distribution of other types of retirement pay.
Despite these limitations, the cases should alert the bench and
bar to the ramifications of retirement pay in a determination of
alimony.
Hayne A. Botts
Smith, 102 IlM. App. 3d 769, 772, 430 N.E.2d 364, 366 (1981); Ripley v. Ripley, 112 Mich.
App. 219, 229, 315 N.W.2d 576, 581 (1982); Busch v. Busch, 618 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. App.
1981); In re Marriage of Laster, - Mont. --- , -, 643 P.2d 597, 603 (1982).
38. Section 8345(i)(1) provides:
Payments under this subchapter which would otherwise be made to an em-
ployee, member or annuitant based upon his service shall be paid (in whole or
in part) by the Office to another person if and to the extent expressly provided
for in the terms of any Court, decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation,
or the terms of any court order or court approved property settlement agree-
ment incident to any court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation.
Any payment under the paragraph to a person bars recovery by any other
person.
5 U.S.C. § 8345(i)(1) (1980).
39. Editor's Note: After the opinions in Bugg and Carter were announced, the
United States Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act,
10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West Supp. 1983). Under the Act, state courts are permitted to
subject military nondisability retirement pay to equitable distribution in separation and
divorce proceedings. In Brown v. Brown, - S.C. -, 302 S.E.2d 860 (1983), the South
Carolina Supreme Court was asked to reconsider Bugg and Carter in light of the new
legislation. The Brown court noted the change in the law, but stated that "the final
decision concerning the treatment of ailitary retirement funds remains with the states."
Id. at , 302 S.E.2d at 861. Without further comment, the court held that military
retirement pay is to be treated as income, a factor in determining alimony, and not as
marital property. The decision in Brown was reaffirmed in Haynes v. Haynes, - S.C.
_ - S.E.2d - (1983).
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II. TAX SAVINGS AS GROUNDS FOR NONALLOCATION OF ALIMONY
AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
In Delaney v. Delaney0 the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld a support payment in which no allocation was made be-
tween child support and alimony. Section 20-3-150 of the South
Carolina Code permits the imposition of nonallocated support
payments if the family court finds good cause for doing so."' The
supreme court ruled that the tax savings which accrued to the
supporting spouse met the good cause requirement, provided the
benefits of the supported spouse tangibly increased as a result.
The dispute in Delaney arose when the wife, pursuant to a
legal separation, petitioned the family court for a reasonable
amount of child support for the couple's three minor children
and a reasonable amount of alimony for herself.42 The husband,
however, asked the court to consider tax consequences in its de-
cision and make no allocation between the amount of child sup-
port and the amount of alimony.43 Based on these tax conse-
quences, the family court awarded the wife a nonallocated
amount of support each month.44 The state supreme court af-
firmed this portion of the order.45
The court reasoned that under section 20-3-1504" a family
court judge may order payment of a consolidated amount repre-
senting both alimony and child support, provided good cause for
nonallocation is presented.47 Shifting tax liability from a sup-
porting spouse who has substantial income to a supported
spouse who has little or no income results in a tax savings for
40. - S.C. -, 293 S.E.2d 304 (1982).
41. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-3-150 (Supp. 1981). Prior to its amendment in 1979, § 20-3-
150 required a trial court in a litigated divorce to segregate an award for permanent
alimony and support between the supported spouse and the children. S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-3-150 (1976). To broaden family court power in marital litigation, the legislature ad-
ded the phrase "unless good cause to the contrary be shown." See 1 HousE JOURNAL 1902
(1979). The legislature also amended the word "wife" to read "supported spouse" and
"spouse receiving alimony." See generally Domestic Relations: Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L.Rv. 105 (1980)(discussing removal of gender-based
classifications).
42. Record at 4.
43. Id. at 6.
44. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 304.
45. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 304.
46. See supra note 41.
47. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 304.
[Vol. 35
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the supporting spouse.48 If the supporting spouse then uses the
tax savings to provide additional support dollars, the supported
spouse will realize increased child support and alimony bene-
fits.49 The court viewed the combination of a tax savings and a
subsequent increase in support as sufficient to meet the good
cause requirement for nonallocation under section 20-3-150.50
The court held, however, that the amount of nonallocated
support in this case was inadequate and constituted an abuse of
the trial court's discretion.51 It considered traditional factors52 in
arriving at this conclusion.5" The court added that the effect of
the award of nonallocated alimony and support would also be
considered in determining the adequacy of decreed support,
5
4
but did not express the weight this factor would be given.
The Delaney decision indicates that an increase in benefit
to the supported spouse must accompany a tax savings to the
supporting spouse to fulfill the good cause requirement of sec-
tion 20-3-150. 55 After the shift in tax liability, the supported
48. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 304. A tax savings can be demonstrated by the interplay
of Internal Revenue Code §§ 71 and 215. LR.C. §§ 71, 215 (West 1978). Under § 71,
periodic payments of alimony are income to the supported spouse. The same payments
are deductible by the supporting spouse under § 215. Child support payments, however,
are neither taxable to the supported spouse nor deductible by the supporting spouse
unless a nonallocated amount of support is made directly to the supported spouse. If a
court makes a nonallocated award, the supporting spouse may deduct the whole amount
while the supported spouse must report the entire amount as taxable income. See Com-
missioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). If the supporting spouse is in a higher tax
bracket than the supported spouse, a consolidated award should result in an overall tax
savings since the support money will be taxed at the receiving spouse's lower rate.
49. - S.C. at - 293 S.E.2d at 304.
50. Id. at -' 293 S.E.2d at 304.
51. Id. at-, 293 S.E.2d at 305. See also concurrence and dissent of Justice Little-
john, Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 305-06 (concurring on the same grounds).
52. Traditional factors include (1) the financial condition of the husband and the
needs of the wife; (2) the health and age of the parties, their respective earning capacities
and individual wealth; (3) the wife's contribution to the accumulation of their joint
wealth; (4) the conduct of the parties; (5) the respective necessities of the parties; (6) the
standard of living of the wife at the time of the divorce; (7) the duration of the marriage;
(8) the ability of the husband to pay alimony- and (9) the actual income of the parties.
Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 305.
53. See, e.g., Lide v. Lide, 277 S.C. 155, 283 S.E.2d 832 (1981); Powers v. Powers,
273 S.C. 51, 254 S.E.2d 289 (1979); Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504
(1977); See generally H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DomsTic RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES
183-84, 442-47 (1968).
54. - S.C. at _, 293 S.E.2d at 305.
55. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 304.
9
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spouse should net more child support and alimony.56 The opin-
ion does not indicate, however, the level of tax savings or the
subsequent increase in support that is necessary for a finding of
good cause under the statute.
Justice Littlejohn dissented from the court's holding that
good cause had been shown,57 and argued that "[tio give one a
tax advantage merely increases the burden of all other taxpay-
ers. );8 Justice Littlejohn pointed out that the supporting spouse,
a medical doctor, was "abundantly able to support his wife and
children and pay his share of supporting the government by way
of taxes." 59 This focus on the burden to taxpayers in general did
not include an objection to the supported spouse's increased tax
burden. Contrary to the majority's finding of good cause, Justice
Littlejohn believed that the nonallocation was purely an accom-
modation to the supporting spouse.10
The United States Supreme Court has specifically recog-
nized that parties to a divorce may, for tax purposes, act as their
own best interests dictate. In Commissioner v. Lester," -the
Court recognized that Congress intended to allow tax liability
shifts between divorcing spouses when it enacted the applicable
code provisions concerning allocated and nonallocated child sup-
port and alimony.62 Apparently the Court in Lester was not con-
cerned with the policy argument that a divorced couple paying
less overall taxes due to nonallocation of support would increase
the tax burden on other taxpayers.
Under Delaney, a shift in tax liability is sufficient to
demonstrate good cause for nonallocation of support, provided
the shift allows the supported spouse to net tangibly more child
support and alimony. Unless the supporting spouse makes the
tax dollars saved available as additional support dollars, a claim
that tax savings is good cause for nonallocation of support will
not be allowed. Both steps are required to fulfill the good cause
56. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 304.
57. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 305.
58. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 306.
59. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 306.
60. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 306.
61. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
62. Id. at 306.
10
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mandate of section 20-3-150.
D'Anne Haydel
III. POST-DIVORCE AWARD OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES TO
EMANCIPATED CHILDREN
The South Carolina Supreme Court held in Kerr v. Kerr
that an emancipated child was entitled to contributions toward
her college expenses from her divorced and remarried father.
This type of award is not unprecedented in South Carolina,"
and Kerr is further evidence of the liberal attitude South Caro-
lina courts have taken toward such expenses.
Melanie Kerr, whose father, George Kerr, was required by a
divorce settlement to pay child support until she became eigh-
teen years old,e5 initiated the action in Kerr. After reaching her
majority, she sought to require her father to contribute to her
college expenses. She had attended college for one semester
before bringing the action and she continued her education dur-
ing the trial and appeal of the case using funds raised by herself
and her mother.68 Ms. Kerr claimed that these funds would not
adequately finance her education. George Kerr asserted that he
and his second wife could not support themselves without aid
from his mother-in-law and, therefore, could not afford to assist
in the payment of his daughter's college education. He further
claimed his mother-in-law would discontinue her assistance if he
were ordered to make the financial contribution. The family
court, upon presentation of conflicting evidence, ordered Mr.
63. - S.C. -, 293 S.E.2d 704 (1982).
64. See Major v. Major, 277 S.C. 318, 286 S.E.2d 666 (1982); Risinger v. Risinger,
273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
65. - S.C. at , 293 S.E.2d at 705.
66. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 706. The evidence indicated that Melanie Kerr had been
financing her education through her mother's disability check, a part-time job and tui-
tion grants. The court, however, did not consider this sufficient to show the daughter's
ability to pay for her own education. From this ruling, one might infer that the court will
not look solely at the child's ability to produce income, but will also consider the hard-
ship obtaining funds places on the child. If this inference is correct it will be incumbent
on an attorney representing a parent to show not only that the child has the ability to
pay for his education, but also that he can do so without undue hardship.
67. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 706. Mr. Kerr asserted that he and his wife spent more
each year than their combined incomes and were able to remain solvent only through the
aid of his in-laws.
1983]
11
Strickland: Domestic Relations
Published by Scholar Commons, 1983
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Kerr to contribute toward his daughter's educational expenses.68
The supreme court upheld the order of the lower court, bas-
ing its decision primarily on a section of the Family Court Act 9
as it was interpreted in Risinger v. Risinger. ° Citing Risinger,
the court said, "the Family Court Act 'allows the Family Court
to make orders running past a child's majority where there are
physical or mental disabilities of the child or other exceptional
circumstances that warrant it'. .... ,7 The court then reaf-
firmed its holding in Risinger that the need for education is the
most likely exceptional circumstance justifying continued sup-
port.7 2 However, "need" alone will not always result in such an
order. The court held that family court judges should use their
discretion, granting requests when there is evidence that (1) the
characteristics of the child indicate he or she will benefit from
college; (2) the child demonstrates the ability to do well, or at
least make satisfactory grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise go
to school; and (4) the parent has the financial ability to help pay
for such an education.7 3 The court then found sufficient evidence
to satisfy the enunciated criteria and upheld the award.
Kerr is a relatively liberal decision regarding postmajority
educational support by a parent. While courts in most jurisdic-
tions will enforce provisions of a divorce decree or a contractual
arrangement requiring a parent to pay for a child's college ex-
penses, few courts have ordered contributions for higher educa-
tion absent any prior decree or agreement.7
68. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 705.
69. Act No. 55, 1968 S.C. Acts, repealed by Act No. 71, 1981 S.C. Acts, recodified at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420 (Cum. Supp. 1982). In pertinent part, the statute reads:
The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction:. . .(17) To make all orders
for support run until further order of the court, except that orders for support
of a child shall run until the child is eighteen years of age or until the child is
sooner married or becomes self-supporting or, where there are physical or
mental disabilities of the child or other exceptional circumstances that war-
rant it, in the discretion of the court, during any period and beyond the child's
minority as such physical or mental disabilities may continue.
(Emphasis supplied).
70. 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
71. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 705 (emphasis supplied by the court in Kerr);
Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. at 38, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
72. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 705.
73. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 705-06.
74. The Supreme Court of Georgia has refused to require contributions despite the
presence of a provision in the original divorce decree. Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175,
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One issue not addressed by Kerr is the determination of
which party the court will assign the burden of proof in future
cases. In reaching its decision, the court resolved two questions
of fact in favor of the daughter: George Kerr's ability to pay for
Melanie Kerr's college expenses and Melanie Kerr's inability to
continue attending college without assistance from her father.
The fact that these questions were resolved in favor of the child
may indicate that the court will place the burden of proof on the
parent seeking to avoid the contribution. This inference is sup-
ported by dicta sympathetic to the child's case: "[E]mancipated
children who no longer have the benefit of a conventional home,
while attempting to further their education, have a severely re-
stricted ability to earn adequate amounts to provide their own
education during this crucial period.
'7 5
Kerr clearly reiterates the supreme court's willingness to
award generous college expenses to children of divorced parents.
Practitioners in domestic law should advise their clients that
they may in the future be held liable for these expenses.
Mitchell C. Payne
IV. A CHILD'S PARENTAL PREFERENCE AS GROUNDS FOR
CUSTODY MODIFICATION
In Bolding v. Bolding,7 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the wishes of a divorced couple's eleven-year-old child
could not justify a transfer of custody when no additional
change in conditions was alleged. The decision reaffirms South
Carolina's adherence to the majority rule77 that although a
child's wishes are to be accorded some weight in custody pro-
ceedings, they are neither conclusive nor controlling.78 The
149 S.E.2d 128 (1966). For a general discussion of how this issue has been treated in
other states, see Veron, Parental Support of Post Majority Children in College:
Changes and Challenges, 17 J. FAI. L. 645 (1979); see also Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 322
(1980).
75. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 706.
76. - S.C. -, 293 S.E.2d 699 (1982).
77. For a general discussion of the majority rule and cases adhering to the rule, see
42 Am. JuR. 2D Infants § 44 (1969).
78. See Smith v. Smith, 261 S.C. 81, 198 S.E.2d 271 (1973); Moorhead v. Scott, 259
S.C. 680, 193 S.E.2d 510 (1972).
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child's welfare is the dispositive factor.79
Approximately one year after the parties' final decree of di-
vorce granted custody of the son and his seven-year-old sister to
the mother, the father petitioned the family court for a custodial
modification 0 based upon the son's desire to live with his father
and, attend school with his lifelong friends. After conducting ex-
tensive interviews with the minor,"1 the trial judge approved the
petition. The supreme court reversed, holding that these
grounds were insufficient to warrant a transfer of custody."
The supreme court observed that to justify a change of cus-
tody "the party seeking the transfer bears the burden of estab-
lishing a material change of conditions substantially affecting
the welfare of the child." 3 The court further observed that the
child's wishes are to be-accorded some weight in the determina-
tion, with the degree of significance depending upon the age of
the child and other attendant circumstances. Ultimately, how-
ever, the welfare of the child must be the predominate consider-
ation.8' The court reasoned that the eleven-year-old's request
standing alone did not establish a material and substantial
change of circumstances.8 5
South Carolina has consistently followed the general rule
that a child's wishes must be subservient to his best interests in
79. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 700.
80. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 700. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1976) provides:
In any action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony the court may at
any stage of the cause, or from time to time after final judgment, make
such orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children
of the marriage and what, if any, security shall be given for the same as
from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case and the
best spiritual as well as other interests of the children may be fit, equita-
ble and just.
81. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 700 (Ness, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 700.
83. Id. at., 293 S.E.2d at 700. See also Lowe v. Lindley, 272 S.C. 143, 249 S.E.2d
750 (1978).
84. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 700; Smith v. Smith, 261 S.C. 81, 198 S.E.2d 271
(1973).
85. - S.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 700. In his dissent, Justice Ness agreed that the
decision must be governed by a concern for the child's welfare, but attacked the major-
ity's disregard of the lower court's findings. In urging deference to the trial judge's order,
Justice Ness concluded that the lower court, in observing the testimony of the parties
and the minor child, was in "a far better position" to determine how the child's interests
would be best served. Id. at , 293 S.E.2d at 701.
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custody proceedings.86 The rule allows consideration of the
child's wishes and, at least with respect to an initial award of
custody, may even permit the choice to be dispositive, provided
the child is of sufficient age to reach a rational decision and
there is no showing that his interests would be best served oth-
erwise. 7 Nevertheless, a petitioner's complaint should not plead
the child's choice as the sole rationale supporting a change cus-
tody.-As Bolding indicates, the court is not apt to permit a post-
divorce custodial modification absent clear proof of circumstan-
tial change. Thus, the proper use of the child's preference lies in
a supportive capacity to an allegation of such change.
In contrast to the general rule, at least three states have
passed statutes that permit a minor child to select his custodial
parent.8 8 Each, however, qualifies the right with a minimum age
requirement.8 9 Several other jurisdictions have enacted statutes
permitting consideration of the child's preference, provided the
child is mature enough to formulate a rational judgment.90
In conclusion, Bolding adheres to the general rule that a mi-
nor child's wishes are not to be viewed as controlling in custodial
modification proceedings. The child's preference does, however,
remain a factor to be considered by the court and provides a
valuable collateral argument in an allegation of a material
change of circumstances substantially affecting the child's
welfare.
Robert T. Strickland
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 261 S.C. 81, 198 S.E.2d 271 (1973); Moorhead v. Scott,
259 S.C. 580, 193 S.E.2d 510 (1972).
87. See Guinan v. Guinan, 254 S.C. 554, 176 S.E.2d 173 (1970). In Guinan, the su-
preme court held that the wishes of a sixteen-year-old were "entitled to great weight in
awarding his custody as between estranged parents." Id. at 557, 176 S.E.2d at 174. The
court held that absent any evidence tending to establish that the child's best interests
would be served otherwise, the child's preference should control. Id., 176 S.E.2d at 174.
88. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (1972); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Page Supp. 1976). See generally Speca, The Role of the
Child in Selecting His or Her Custodian in Divorce Cases, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 437 (1977-
1978).
89. See supra note 88. The Georgia statute requires the child to have reached the
age of fourteen before he may invoke the right, whereas the Mississippi and Ohio provi-
sions place the minimum age at twelve years.
90. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(i)
(West Supp. 1976); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 571-46(3) (1976). See generally Speca, supra
note 88, at 441.
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